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Abstract

The European Union is the world’s leading regulator, imposing strict laws on all sectors of
industry including chemical manufacturers. The bloc’s programs imposing these strict chemical
regulations are entitled Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS) and Registration,
Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals, or REACH. These laws are imposed to
ensure that the chemicals present in products are properly recorded and to ensure the health and
safety of citizens and the environment. This thesis will discuss the role the European Union plays
in the world regarding the chemical industry and how countries modify their own regulations to
ensure their companies have continued access to the EU’s market, and with the use of case
studies which test The Brussels Effect, coined by Anu Bradford. The history of European
integration and the European Union is discussed, as it provides important context for why the
bloc imposes strict regulatory standards. The largest trading partners of the EU were forced to
comply and adopt many of the EU’s new laws while one in particular (the United States) did not,
and instead left it up to the private companies.
The evidence reported in this thesis will prove that the European Union is the world’s
leading regulator of chemical and toxic waste substances and that many non-EU countries are
forced to comply and adopt REACH-like policies if they want to have continued access to the
EU’s markets. Three of the EU’s largest trading partners, South Korea, Japan and China
amended their chemical regulations to be more in line with the EU. Further, the EU will continue
to be the most important regulator for at least another half century. It will be up to other
countries with large markets to decide if they want to be crowned as the world’s regulator.

3

I recommend that developed countries agree on one set of regulations to ensure the health
and safety of their citizens and the environment as a whole. Developing countries are not wellequipped enough yet to abide by these standards, therefore, allowing them to have their own
standards is understandable. Eventually, as developing countries grow, the health and safety of
all citizens and the environment will become the norm.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review

The European Union is known to have some of the strictest chemical regulations in the
world. These regulations concern everyday products including food, chemicals, clothing,
furniture and electrical products. This thesis will focus on the EU’s regulation of chemicals.
The first main source of legislation to regulate hazardous chemicals in the European
Union was called the Restriction of Hazardous Substances, or RoHS. RoHS originated in 2002
affecting six hazardous products found mostly in electrical products and equipment. The ban
went into effect on June 1st, 2006, in which all products sold in the European Union had to
comply by these regulations.1
The European Union monitors chemical regulations through its Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals program, or REACH. REACH’s main aim is to
protect the citizens and the environment by better identifying the chemicals present in
substances. Manufacturers and companies are required to provide data and information on the
substances that are being sold in the EU market. If the manufacturer does not do so, then they
will be barred from selling their products in the EU market. That information provided by them
will be uploaded to a single database in the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), based in
Helsinki, where citizens and companies have full access to this information. One of the main
reasons for developing and implementing REACH was because of the hazardous products
developed and sold within the market. In some cases, very high amounts of hazardous materials
were sold but were not known to the EU regulators or the customer buying the products. With

1
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the implementation of REACH, customers and the EU regulators now have a single database to
check the hazards of certain chemicals and products.2
Since the increased shipments of hazardous materials throughout the world began in the
1980s, numerous global treaties and conventions have been written to set rules and standards to
regulate these chemicals. The European Union is a party to the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm
conventions, binding the community to follow what is written in the document. Further, the EU
has implemented legal measures ensuring that all member states abide by the rules of the treaty.
Since each member state must abide the treaties, the laws are enacted on a national level, not on
the community level.3 Therefore, when REACH was established, many of the goals that the EU
wanted to change were in the process of being changed at the national level. These four
conventions are the Basel Convention (1989), Rotterdam Convention, (1998), The Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979) and the Stockholm Convention (2001).
These conventions were designed due to the increase of shipments of hazardous waste from
industrialized, global north countries to developing, global south countries. Many of these
developing countries import these banned chemicals at lower costs than industrialized nations.
Additionally, there have been many reports of chemicals beings imported without the formal
consent of the country’s government. Most of these countries are in Africa, including Zimbabwe,
Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Congo, Liberia and Gabon.4
The Basel Convention outlines the legality of waste management. It was established in
1989 to protect human health from garbage being transported from developed countries to

2
3

“REACH.” European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach_en.htm

“Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their

Disposals.” UN Environment Programme. http://www.basel.int/?tabid=4499#EU
OKARU, VALENTINA O. "THE BASEL CONVENTION: CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENT OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." Fordham Environmental Law Report 4, no. 2 (1993):
137-65. Accessed February 1, 2021. http://www.jstor.org.ccny-proxy1.libr.ccny.cuny.edu/stable/44174465.
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developing countries. According to Katharina Kummer Peiry, the Basel Convention was a good
example of an approach moving from bipolar to multipolar. The issue of waste management has
moved beyond the export, transit and import of trash to the overall global issues it possesses.
Further, non-state actors have become increasingly part of the issue, partnering with
governments and the secretariat to ensure the Basel Convention is carried out accordingly. Peiry
points out the difficulty in beginning the implementation of the treaty as amendments discussing
the ban of shipment of waste from OECD countries to non-OECD countries. The amendment
slowed the process down because countries could not agree whether to adopt or not adopt the
changes. This ban forced many industrialized countries to leave the negotiating table as it was
not in any of their best interests (politically) to allow that amendment to pass. Many developed
nations began to see the treaty as assisting the global south to help them improve their waste
practices, which was seen a politically irrelevant to the industrialized nations. With changing
trade patterns, technologically advancing global south nations and the spike in the price of raw
materials began to be taken seriously by the convention. The lone NGO monitoring and
evaluating the convention was originally fully supportive of the ban of the shipment of waste
from developed to developing countries but started to ease their support of it. Peiry states that the
change in the NGO’s stance was due to the possibility of using the waste as a cheap alternative to
certain raw materials and the possibility of creating new environmentally friendly jobs in these
waste receiving nations.5
The Rotterdam Convention deals with the international trade in pesticides and industrial
chemicals. According to Tomas Mac Sheoin, the Rotterdam Convention faced strong opposition

5

Katharina Kummer Peiry. "The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal." Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 107
(2013): 434-36. Accessed February 1, 2021. doi:10.5305/procannmeetasil.107.0434.
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to the language in the convention that banned certain chemicals and toxic substances, including
chrysotile asbestos. The countries that objected to it being placed on the list were the ones most
dependent on the industry. Further, it will take a long time for any chemicals or toxic substances
to be placed on the list because it must undergo a rigorous set of drawn out and complex
procedures. The convention covers 40 chemicals, some of which faced major opposition from
many nations. Sheoin mentions two examples, one regarding chrysotile asbestos and the other
involving pesticide endosulfan. Canada was thoroughly opposed to listing this toxin under the
convention, along with a small number of other countries. They opposed this effort against 100
other countries who were for it in 1998, 2003, 2004 and 2006. Once Canada closed their last
asbestos mine in 2013, Canada dropped the issue and went forward with allowing it to be listed
as a toxic chemical, though seven other countries, still with open asbestos mines, continued to
oppose its listing as a toxic chemical. Second, India rejects the listing of pesticide endosulfan as
they are the largest producer and consumer of the chemical.6
The Convention on Long Range/Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) was struck to
counter the harmful effects that acid rain and snow have on the environment and human
populations. Armin Rosencranz states that the convention was a major advance in international
law regarding environmental protection. Additionally, it was the first environmental agreement
that brought together both Europe’s Western and Eastern Blocs. The agreement allowed for
information sharing on certain harmful emissions such as sulfur.7 Further Jorgen Wettestad in
Designing Effective Environmental Regimes: The Case of the Convention on Long-Range
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Mac Sheoin, Tomás. "Controlling Chemical Hazards: Global Governance, National Regulation?" Social Justice 41,
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Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) states that certain countries signed onto the treaty, did
not implement enough environmental regulations to achieve its goal, but still reduced their
emissions that were called for in the treaty. Wettestad uses the examples of the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Norway. In the United Kingdom, it was industrial recession, lower demand
for energy and privatization of companies that led to emissions reduction. The Netherlands saw a
switch from coal to natural gas and Norway reduced their consumption of oil. These three
countries are in contrast to Germany where regulation was the reason that they were able to
reduce their emissions in line with the treaty. Third, Wettestad states that the United Kingdom
does not experience the environmental issues that their neighbors do because of its location. He
writes that because of the country’s wind and atmospheric conditions, the UK exports most of its
pollution to the Scandinavian countries of Norway and Sweden which negatively impacts their
soil and precipitation. Britain’s switch from cheap coal fired power plants to more expensive, but
cleaner, natural gas ones would benefit more of its neighbors than it would itself, proving to be a
difficult and expensive situation. Politics transcend the situation as well, as switching from coal
to natural gas would mean the loss of thousands of jobs, many who are miners and those who
live and work in mining communities. Wettestad sees the situation as toxic for all parties
involved.8
The Stockholm Convention tackles the issue of pesticides and is designed to help protect
the health of humans and the environment from persistent organic pollutants (POPs). Peter L.
Lallas states that the treaty contains strong language to restrict if not eliminate much of the
world’s toxic chemicals. Further, the convention’s framework allows for the document to be

8

Wettestad, Jørgen. "DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: THE CASE OF THE
CONVENTION ON LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION (CLRTAP)." Energy & Environment 10,
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9

amended to shape the future needs of the world. Further, Lallas states that there is not one
framework for all countries to abide by. Instead, there are country specific exemptions that allow
for individual countries to be evaluated on their own circumstances. Therefore, underdeveloped
countries have more time and are exempt from certain features and requirements listed in the
treaty that developed countries must abide by. The ten substances originally discussed for the
convention are industrial chemicals. The delegations began negotiations with the intent on fully
eliminating these toxins with exceptions of those with “recognized uses.” The negotiations
proceeded and allowed for each country present at the discussion to state their position on each
of the ten chemicals and explain the use for the ones that they didn’t want banned.9
The EU’s REACH program encompasses many of the ideas and policy goals set forth in
the global treaties. The EU established its REACH program, as I discussed earlier, to ensure the
safety of its member states’ citizens and to protect the environment from hazards. The four
conventions are specified to certain environmental issues which the EU set out to resolve when
implementing its REACH program. The Stockholm Convention, for example, was convened to
regulate (or eliminate) toxic pesticides. The EU’s REACH program forces the manufacturer to
submit the chemical to its main data base, and if EU regulators brand it as being too toxic, then
the manufacturer must remove it from market. Therefore, the EU’s REACH program essentially
compiles all the policies written in each document and puts them into legal force.
I argue here that countries outside the EU are enacting rules to comply with EU
regulations. In response to the implementation of the EU’s REACH program, Japan revised their
regulations regarding chemicals as well. Yoshiko Naiki writes that Japan adopted some of the
EU’s regulations, but changed them to be more suitable to Japan. Indeed, there were concerns

9

Lallas, Peter L. "The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants." The American Journal of
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among Japanese government officials in attempting to force foreign practices and cultures into
Japan. They realized that the difference in culture needed to be amended to allow for
compatibility in taking a European law and transforming it to Japanese law. Naiki discusses
Japan’s Chemical Substances Control Act, known in Japan as Kashinho. Unlike in the EU where
the burden is placed on the companies and manufacturers to list the chemicals in their products,
in Japan it is the opposite. The government took control of the process to list the chemicals in the
products produced by private companies. Due to the size and the importance of the EU market,
similar to other countries that will be discussed below, Japan adopted these new regulations to
keep their access to the European market open. Similar to the EU, however, the changed policy
of Kashinho allows for a sped-up assessment of toxins and chemicals present already on the
market. The government will then take those lists of chemicals and create a database similar to
the one in the EU.10 In addition to Japan’s new government-run database that lists which
chemicals are in specific products, some private Japanese companies have also been following
the lead of the EU. Anu Bradford writes that Hitachi, following a RoHS directive decided to
phase out six chemicals that are present in 70 of its products by March 2005. Additionally, the
company switched to lead-free solder that was used in its Japanese based factories and all of its
products produced throughout the world.11
Tomas Mac Sheoin adds to Naiki’s description regarding Japan. In addition to Japan,
both South Korea and China have revised their chemical regulations following the EU’s REACH
program implementation. Sheoin writes that there are similarities between the new South Korean
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regulations colloquially known as K-REACH which were introduced in April 2013 and the EU’s
program. Additionally, China’s chemical regulation policies have become increasingly similar to
Europe’s. In both cases, the regulation of the chemicals gap has increasingly closed, due to the
importance of the European market. However, Sheoin notes that while Chinese laws regarding
toxins may be increasing, the laws are worthless if they are not enforced. Many of the regional
environmental agencies throughout China lack the proper technology and training to ensure the
enforcement of these laws, therefore the oversight of chemical regulation slips.12 The South
Korean based company of Samsung proudly displays its compliance to the EU’s RoHS standard
on its website and ensures that this is part of its global compliance strategy. 13
Unlike the EU, Japan, South Korea and China, the United States has taken a hands-off
approach to regulation in the past three decades. Tomas Mac Sheoin writes that the last time
major legislation was written and passed by the United States Congress was following the 1989
oil disaster of the Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska. The legislation strengthened federal
oversight of the industry. Twenty years later, following the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the
Gulf of Mexico, legislation was introduced into Congress but was blocked because a higher
dollar limit was placed on oil companies’ liability for damages. Throughout those twenty years,
the EU overtook the United States as the standard bearer for chemical regulation.14 Further,
many companies have understood the importance of the EU and East Asian markets, and
individual companies have come to put their own regulations in place, since the government will

12
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not. If these companies want continued access to these markets, then they must meet baselines.
Anu Bradford states that the vice president of the chemical giant DuPont independently
implemented many of REACH’s policies ensuring their continued access to the world market.15
Anu Bradford discusses the importance of REACH legislation, and how with public concern,
individual member states and the support of NGOs, the EU increased its oversight of the
industry.16 In addition to DuPont, tech giants such as Apple and Dell have complied with the
European standards and advertise this on their respective websites. The leadership of these three
massive corporations make it almost impossible for smaller ones not to follow, as long as they
want to be relevant.17 States in the United States began to take action to comply with Europe’s
REACH program before the federal government did. REACH was implemented by California
and the California Department of Toxic Substances Control is forced now to gather safety
information and stay in compliance as much as possible with the EU.18 As other states began
amending their chemical regulations, the United States government at the federal level began to
do so as well. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is the US’s chemicals regulation
legislation. It began to be revised in 2016 amid lower opposition by private chemical companies.
As stated, many American chemical companies have been in compliance with REACH already,
so the changes were in the interest of them as well. The amendments to the legislation are similar
to REACH but have some important differences. The changed TSCA requires companies to
compile less information about the chemicals being used and that it mandates the EPA to show
“unreasonable risk” for the chemical to be regulated.19

15
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The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was established in 1976 to oversee chemical
regulations in the United States. According to John S. Applegate, the TSCA was progressive for
its time as it was the standard bearer for regulating chemicals. Unlike REACH, however, the
TSCA underperformed as its parent agency, the EPA, did little to enforce it. Additionally, its
final text was compromised to appeal to both the left and right and weak interpretation by the
judiciary gives it little power and enforcement over national regulating laws. According to
Applegate, if the TSCA is thesis, then REACH is its antithesis. The lack of powerful language
and strong interpretation by legislatures and the judiciary makes it weak and difficult to enforce.
Whereas REACH is the opposite, it possesses strong language and is enforced vigorously.
Applegate states that the TSCA can learn and adopt a lot from REACH and believes the United
States should do more to regulate on a federal level. He makes it clear, however, that both
programs will continue to guide chemical regulation around the world. Further, Applegate
explains that both the TSCA and REACH are not looking to eliminate all toxic chemicals,
instead both, even if only in theory, are looking to regulate and control the manufacturing and
consumer use of toxic chemicals. Transparency and simplicity should be the end goal for both
for these programs. Consumers should be able to have access to information regarding the
chemicals in their products, and he believes it should be the government at the helm. Lastly,
Applegate states that globalization intensifies the importance of TSCA and REACH. The
regulation of chemicals is vital to the safety of human health and the environment.20
The EU’s REACH program, based on this literature review, shows the influence it has
around the world. REACH and RoHS influenced other countries to upgrade their regulations
regarding chemicals and toxins. Japan, South Korea and China have adopted many of REACH’s
20

Applegate, John S. "Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform." Ecology
Law Quarterly35, no. 4 (2008): 721-69. Accessed February 8, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24114958.
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programs and policies to continue to have open access to Europe’s market. International treaties
that comprise dozens of nations help give legitimacy to Europe’s policies and additionally bind
nations to certain regulatory standards and to ensure future generations live healthy and in a
healthy environment. There are, however, certain gaps present in the literature. These gaps,
include, for example, how far will the European Union’s policies go to influencing other
countries to adopt some of their policies? In other words, will all countries that want access to
the European market continue to change their regulatory policies, or will there be a stopping
point? Will another country eventually hold the torch of the “world’s regulator?” My research
adds to the literature by exploring these issues further.
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Chapter 2: History of the European Union and its Regulatory Authority

The idea of a unified Europe can trace its roots back to 1693 when English Quaker and
American immigrant William Penn developed a proposal entitled “Essay Towards the Present
and Future Peace of Europe” which would ensure harmony reigned over the continent.21 It’s
obvious to state that Penn’s proposal did not come to fruition, as over the next 300 years
hundreds of millions of people would die at the expense of leaders’ egos and failed attempts at
world domination. Following the Napoleonic Wars and the changes Napoleon brought to the
continent, French philosopher Saint-Simon wrote his ideas on unifying Europe which similarly
reflect the EU institutional framework that is currently present, including a capital that would be
close to the EU’s current capital, Brussels.22 The next 100 years would bring about nationalism,
the second stage of imperialism and a massive military buildup. The period between Napoleon
and World War I experienced relative peace compared to what would follow. Following the
deaths and destruction brought upon by World War I, the League of Nations was established to
ensure peace prevailed. Hawks on France’s political right urged for tougher reparations on
Germany, but many hardliners were blocked by the United Kingdom and the United States
which signed the Treaty of Versailles, but never joined the League of Nations. Rapprochement
between the two countries began with France’s foreign minister Aristide Briand who aspired for
peace with Berlin. His German counterpart, foreign minister Gustav Stresemann also wanted

21
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peace between the two nations. Briand understood that peace would only be ensured if both
countries worked closely together.
In 1925, both men struck the Locarno Treaty, which secured the post-war settlement and
the new territorial changes with Alsace-Lorraine on the border between France and Germany and
with Poland on Germany’s eastern border (which earned both men a Nobel Peace Prize the
following year). In a speech to the League of Nations in 1929, Aristide Briand spoke of the idea
of a united Europe. He presented his ideas formally to his European counterparts the following
year. The initial discussion centered around a customs union as the Great Depression began to
destroy states’ economies. Briand’s main idea of the union was for France and Germany to
cooperate closely together. Briand and Stresemann’s ideas were never realized due to the onset
of the Great Depression and the rise of nationalism in Germany. The deaths of Briand and
Stresemann in 1932 and 1929, respectively, ensured the mutual destruction of any peace between
the two countries.23 The number of deaths and destruction, and the organized killings of eleven
million people during WWII, renewed talks of peace. The United Nations was established in
1945 following the war, succeeding the failed League of Nations. However, peace in Europe was
a main concern for France especially. France was invaded by Germany three times in less than a
century, so they worried for their safety. To begin, the Council of Europe was established in
1949 to ensure peace and democracy, and to protect European citizens from being oppressed by
the state. Today, the Council of Europe, with its broad membership of 47 countries, and the
European Court of Human Rights, which upholds the European Convention of Human Rights.24

23
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The establishment of the Council of Europe was one step forward in ensuring state sponsored
oppression did not occur. Further integration was vital for peace and cooperation among
European states, more importantly between France and Germany. The idea of an economic union
between states began to take shape, twenty years after Briand’s proposal failed. French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman gave a speech, in what is now known as the Schuman Declaration,
proposing the idea of pooling resources such as coal and steel between member states. Acting
upon this proposal, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was born and consisted of
France, West Germany, and four other Western European nations, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Italy.
Thus, a communal high authority was established to oversee the shared resources of coal
and steel. Coal and steel were the backbone of any industrialized state, and there was a lucrative
market provided by the US who was supporting the war in Korea which began in 1950. Sharing
resources would expound the economies of the six nations, and once these commodities were
joined, war would destroy the six countries.25 The ECSC was the main forerunner to what would
become the European Union and the supranational powers it consists of today. The ideas of
Briand and Stresemann twenty years earlier finally began to bear fruit. The newfound success of
the ECSC led to the establishment and de facto successor of the coal and steel community, the
European Economic Community, or the EEC. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, put the EEC
into force, allowing trade to move freely across the borders of the six countries, expanding the
Community beyond just coal and steel. No specific economic factors were singled out, ensuring
that all parts of the economy were now free for trade.26 In 1984, the EEC became the European

Tom, 22-42. LEIDEN; BOSTON: Brill, 2017. Accessed February 22, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w76vj2.6. 26.
25
Ibid., 27.
26
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Community (EC) which enhanced economic ties to include political, security and social
cooperation. The EC and its forerunner the EEC evolved into the European Union, allowing all
sectors of the economy to trade freely across borders and expand this cooperation to other areas.
Member countries do not collect tariffs on traded goods, ensuring goods made in Amsterdam
will be sold at the same price in Naples. Further, the EEC underwent three enlargements, the first
in 1973 with the additions of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (the latter of which was
stalled by Charles de Gaulle’s France), the second in 1981 with the addition of Greece and the
third in 1986 with the additions of Spain and Portugal.27 The Community gained further power as
the economies of Western European nations added to the wealth and importance of the bloc.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union led to a new alignment in the
community. Germany reunified, shifting the balance of power away from Britain and France and
more squarely onto Berlin. The Treaty on the European Union, commonly known as the
Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, which created the basis of today’s European Union. It sets
out to further bind the union together, including having a common foreign and security policy,
strengthening the power of the European Parliament, and introducing European citizenship.
Eventually, a subgroup of the EU created a framework for a common currency known as the
Euro.28 The Maastricht Treaty allowed for the union to take on more responsibility above the
individual member states. The most recent convention was the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which
resolved issues that arose from previous treaties. The treaty greatly expanded the power of the
European Parliament and its legislative authority, including in agriculture and energy. Further,
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the Parliament and the EU Commission are on an equal footing, ensuring that elected officials
have a say in how and what the Union achieves.29 The history of European integration stretches
back centuries, yet it has only been in effect since 1950. As the 20th century continued, the desire
for further integration increased and the European Union has adapted to this. Today, the EU
consists of 27 countries and over 40 agencies, one of which will be discussed in this thesis, the
European Chemicals Agency which oversees the REACH program.
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Chapter 3: Regulatory Authority

Three EU institutions oversee the regulatory tasks of the EU: The Council of the
European Union, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission. According to
Anu Bradford, author of The Brussels Effect, “The Council brings together the executive
branches of the member states and is composed of the government ministers of each member
state.” “The EP represents the EU citizenry and exercises legislative authority in conjunction
with the Council in this capacity.” Finally, “The Commission functions as the EU’s executive
arm and enjoys substantial independent decision-making authority.”30 These three institutions are
intended to balance each other out, to ensure one branch does not have more power than the
other or that one acts on their own. However, the Commission retains a great deal of power, as
one of its main objectives is to uphold its commitment of integration. “The Commission has a
strong ideological commitment and institutional preference for European integration. As more
regulation typically amounts to more integration, the growing regulatory agenda has clearly
served the Commission’s fundamental goal of furthering European integration.”31 The
Commission seeks to ensure all laws and regulations passed in the EU are integrated into the
bloc.
Since all regulations are common among the 27 member states, integration is a result
regardless. The EU’s vast regulatory ability is unmatched when it comes to the world’s other
economic powerhouses. The United States and China (both of which will be discussed in detail
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later) are two countries that have the ability and would have the global influence, but both
choose not to for separate reasons. The United States lacks the political will to regulate
extensively, instead chooses to regulate when it deems only essential. China’s regulatory
capacity, however, will take some time to build, and it would prefer to build its internal market
before mandating further regulations.32 Therefore, this leaves the European Union as the mantle
holder regarding regulations. As a union composed of democratically elected governments, along
with its own parliament, the Commission must also work to make sure that its actions taken are
accepted by member states, its citizens, and the platforms of political parties across the spectrum.
“Harmonized environmental or product safety standards across the EU allow political parties on
the left to protect consumers while also allowing parties on the right to prioritize trade across the
common market.”33 Both sides of the aisle can claim a victory in this instance, as environmental
hazards are commonly a more liberal platform while prioritizing economic trade and business are
typically a more conservative platform. European Union regulations, as will be seen later in this
thesis, will be the baseline for its regulatory global standing. Countries around the world have
adapted to European standards for all products, including chemicals, to ensure their continued
access to the EU market.
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Chapter 4: REACH Legislation

REACH, or Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals is the
legislation that oversees limits that requires private companies to report hazardous materials
found in their products. REACH is overseen by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), an
agency of the European Union, established in 2007 and based in Helsinki.34 The mission of the
organization is “To be at the center of knowledge on the sustainable management of chemicals,
serving a wide range of EU politics and global initiatives, for the benefit of citizens and the
environment.”35 The agency is present to ensure the safety of citizens and the environment of the
EU and its member states. According to the European Commission’s website,
REACH shifts the responsibility from public authorities to industry with regards
to assessing and managing the risks posed by chemicals and providing appropriate
safety information for their users. It impacts on a wide range of companies across
many sectors beyond the chemical industry. It requires new forms of cooperation
among companies, enhancing communication along the supply chain, as well as
developing tools to guide and assist companies and public authorities in its
implementation.36
REACH puts the responsibility on the private companies as opposed to the government. Though
the EU does not restrict REACH to the chemical private sector, this thesis will just focus on the
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chemical companies involved. The main objective of the program, similar to the overall
objective of the ECHA, is to ensure maximum protection of the health of citizens and the
environment, while at the same time allowing the free movement of chemicals throughout the
bloc. The goals include ensuring competitiveness and innovation.37
REACH and the ECHA work closely with the European Commission which was
discussed in further detail in chapter 3. “The Commission plays a key role in the authorization
process as it determines the substances subject to authorization and decides whether to grant
authorization.”38 After being recommended or not recommended for authorization by REACH
and the ECHA, it is up to the Commission on whether or not to allow the chemical to enter the
market. Further, a committee composed of representatives from each EU member state is present
to discuss the following tasks: regulation of fees, regulations on the arrangements for the Boards
of appeals and ECHA and the regulations on test methods.39 The committee, made up of
individuals from member states, has the final say on whether to grant access, or not, to the
distribution of a certain chemical. REACH and the ECHA can work together to allow, or not to
allow a certain chemical to be distributed. Then the decision is passed onto the Commission,
who’s leadership may say yes or no. However, the committee has the power to reverse that
decision.
One more step is required if the above succeeds. The governments of member states must
then ensure careful enforcement of the regulations. This is where the ECHA’s Enforcement
Forum formally known as the Forum for Exchange of Information on Enforcement, comes into
play. The forum works with regulation networks across the Union to ensure correct enforcement
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on the EU’s set of regulations and make sure they are correctly applied. The Forum is composed
of one representative from each member state and meets three times a year to ensure the
enforcement of REACH regulations.40 The bureaucracy surrounding chemical regulation in the
EU may seem extreme, but it is set up to protect the health and safety of European citizens and
the environment they live in. REACH was created to enforce private companies in taking
responsibility for being transparent to their consumers.
Anu Bradford in The Brussels Effect discusses the importance of REACH legislation.
Public concern helped drive the EU to act along with new legislation arising from member states.
“Sweden spearheaded a push for new chemicals regulation, supported by Austria, Denmark,
Finland, and the Netherlands. A number of environmental, health, and consumer advocacy
NGOs voiced support.”41 Bradford writes that a large coalition between the public and numerous
governments helped to drive the bloc to adopt new chemical regulation standards. Other
organizations started to support the need for new legislation as well. “In particular, large
retailers, who sought to bolster consumer confidence and avoid chemical standards, supported
REACH. Regulators also received critical backing from the Commission’s Directorate General
for the Environment and the Parliament’s Environment Committee.”42 The vast support for
reforms made it almost impossible for the Commission and Parliament not to act. Unlike in other
countries such as Japan and the United States (both of which will be discussed in a later chapter)
the majority of the public and private businesses supported the new legislation. This is a huge
contrast especially with the United States, where private companies and anti-regulators cry foul
when drafting new legislation that would reform the industry.
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Though many industries supported new reforms, there were obviously critics mostly from
the chemical industry itself. They argued that new regulation would increase costs which would
eventually be passed down onto the consumer and that the law would impede new development
of substances, fearing that they would not comply with EU requirements.43 European nations
with large chemical industries including France, Germany, Italy, Ireland and the United
Kingdom understood the concerns of the industry, but failed to match the enthusiasm of those
supporting the legislation.44 Four out of the five largest producers were the bloc’s largest and
most influential nations, and even they could not stop the passage of the legislation. This shows
how dedicated the advocates of the bill were. In addition to the European governments and
chemical companies against the reforms were, one of the, if not the largest opponents to the
reforms was the United States. As will be discussed in a later chapter, the United States prefers
to take an anti-regulation approach, mostly backed by large corporations who have sway over
politicians. Bradford writes: “With the full support of the Bush administration, US firms engaged
in ‘eight years of vigorous opposition,’ arguing that REACH would burden manufacturers for
little gain for health and the environment. In 2002, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
directed American embassy staffs across Europe to oppose REACH.”45 Due to its anti-regulatory
stance it is clear why the United States did not want REACH to pass. They understood the
implications the legislation could have on the American chemical industry and the loss of profit
that would happen. In addition to Powell’s direction, Washington filed a formal complaint with
the Commission and again with industry leaders, they “engaged in efforts to ‘educate’ other
[non-EU] countries so that they could join the United States in raising concerns about
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REACH.”46 As we know today, the efforts of the US to erase REACH were moot. Even with the
backlash, the legislation was able to be passed through, and REACH became the world’s most
impactful regulations.
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Chapter 5: Non-EU Countries Adapting REACH-Like Legislation

This chapter explores how non-EU countries adopted REACH like legislation and
programs in the wake of EU adoption. Countries outside Europe that have adopted some
REACH programs include South Korea, Japan and China. Europe’s large internal, high income
market, consisting of over 440 million people, makes it a desirable place for goods from other
countries. These goods must abide by regulations put in place by the European Union, therefore,
non-EU countries must ensure their goods comply.

South Korea

South Korea’s regulation of chemicals dates back to the 1960s, similar to when other
nations began regulating their chemical industries. The first piece of legislation was passed in
1963 titled the “Act on Poisons and Toxins” which focused on preventing the poisoning of
human beings by chemicals. In 1990, the government enacted the Toxic Chemicals Control Act
(TCCA) which expanded the scope of chemical protections, beyond just citizens’ health, but also
included the environment as well.47 Following the passage of Europe’s Restriction of Hazardous
Substances Directive (RoHS) initiative which restricts the use of certain chemicals and toxins in
consumer electronic equipment, the South Korean government adopted their own version, The
Act for Resource Recycling of Electrical and Electronic Equipment, colloquially known as
“Korean RoHS,” which has the same functions as the EU’s legislation.48 Seoul began to copy
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much of the legislation passed by the EU that became known as REACH. South Korea’s
Ministry of Environment of Korea (MoE) enacted “The Act on Registration and Evaluation, etc.
of Chemical Substances,” and was dubbed “K-REACH.”49 K-REACH mirrors much of the EU’s
own program and was designed to do so. Some similar qualities include appointing an only
representative (someone based physically in the EU who possesses abundant knowledge in the
handling of toxic substances50) and both share a main purpose: to ensure the health and safety of
citizens and environment.51 Some differences include South Korea’s coverage of biocides while
the EU does not. Also, the EU requires all companies to register all existing substances, while
South Korea only mandates registration of required substances.52 South Korea’s implementation
of similar REACH legislation was due in part to acquiring access to the European Union’s
market.
South Korea’s adoption of many EU policies has proved the importance of the EU’s
market to the country. In The Brussels Effect, Anu Bradford notes that South Korea has quickly
copied many of REACH’s policies. “Several sources indicate that the EU was used as a model
for South Korea’s law. The Korean Ministry of Environment website notes that ‘Advanced
countries enforce a variety of environmental regulations on electrical & electronic and
automobile industry more strictly to serve the cause of sustainable development…’”53 Bradford
states that regulations are put forward to ensure the health and safety of their citizens and the
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environment, and that all developed countries have an obligation to do so. The South Korean
government adopted these EU laws for these reasons. According to Tomas Mac Sheoin in
“Controlling Chemical Hazards: Global Governance National Regulation?” he states that South
Korea was forced to adapt to European like chemical policies if they wanted to continue their
access to the EU market. “In the case of [South] Korea, the state argued that the regulatory gap
between [South] Korea and the EU and OECD countries was a threat to competitiveness of the
[South] Korean chemical industry due to its lack of capacity to respond to foreign regulations.”54
South Korea’s chemical industry was growing exponentially throughout the first decade of the
twenty-first century, Mac Sheoin adds. South Korea’s chemical industry rounded out the top five
for the first time, leapfrogging over nations such as France, Taiwan and the Netherlands, worth
over USD$149 billion by 2014.55 The country’s growing chemical industry increased due to its
use of regulated chemicals in their products.
Unlike in the United States, France and Taiwan who produce biochemicals and
pharmaceuticals for export, countries like South Korea produce chemicals that are then used in a
finished product manufactured in their own country.56 Chemicals produced in South Korea are
put into finished products including automobiles and machinery, and then exported to its major
trading partners such as the United States and the European Union. Indeed, the European Union
is South Korea’s third largest export destination, and South Korea is the EU’s eighth largest
export destination. The main exports to the European Union include machinery, transport
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equipment, appliances and plastics, all four of which require chemicals to be produced.57 South
Korea’s adoption of REACH-like policies allows for easier access to trade without worrying
about abiding by EU REACH regulations. Further, South Korea has achieved a trade surplus
with the European Union beginning in 2017. Since 2009, trade has grown between the two
nations, and grew faster following the passage of K-REACH. In 2009, the EU imported nearly
€30 billion worth of South Korean goods. By 2019, that number surpassed €47 billion. The
majority of the surplus began after the adoption of K-REACH, growing nearly €10 billion over
four years, from 2015 to 2019.58 Easing the barriers to trade by synching their chemical
regulations made it significantly easier to export goods from South Korea to the European
Union. Brussels’ tightening of regulations forced other countries, in this example, South Korea,
to do the same. It would have been too much to lose access to South Korea’s third major trading
partner had they not further regulated their chemical industry.

Japan

Japan’s original chemical legislation was passed in 1973, titled Chemical Substances
Control Act, colloquially known as Kashinho. The legislation predated that of the Europe (1979)
Union and the United States (1976).59 Japan’s chemical legislation began to develop around the
same time as it did in other developed countries. Yoshiko Naiki in “Assessing Policy Research:
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Japan’s Policy Reform in Response to the EU’s REACH Regulation,” writes that like many other
non-EU countries Japan adopted many EU like REACH regulations to ensure the continued
access Tokyo has to the European market.60 Japan is the EU’s second largest trading partner in
Asia, just after China and is the bloc’s seventh largest importer and exporter of goods overall.61
Japan exported €63 billion worth of goods in 2019, surpassing the 2011 high of €60 billion.62
The European Union is a vital market for Japanese goods and securing its continued access had
to be ensured. As stated above, the EU and Japan were integral trading partners before the
implementation of REACH, but one of REACH’s defining principles was to ensure that all
chemicals entering the market were accounted for and studied. “REACH now covers ‘old’
substances that are already on the market in addition to ‘new’ substances yet to be introduced
into the market.”63 The term ‘old substances’ refers to chemicals present on the market before the
passage of chemical legislation in the 1970s. Chemical manufacturers were obligated to submit
the risks of these toxins, but only certain ones were given ‘priority.’ This allowed chemical
producers to skirt the long, sometimes arduous system of waiting for a chemical to be allowed to
be sold on the market as it was already grandfathered into the system. The new legislation,
however, closed this loophole, ensuring that all chemicals are thoroughly studied for the benefit
of the consumer and the environment. Kashinho requires all substances to be studied including
old and new chemicals. Similar to prior REACH regulations, Kashinho underwent minor delays
in assessing the risks of old chemicals. These delays were overcome, however, when Japan’s
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three ministries overseeing Kashinho (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of
the Environment and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare) proposed amending the
legislation in 2008. The amendment passed the Japanese Parliament in May 2009, only three
years after REACH legislation was passed by the EU.64 Kashinho’s amendments were passed by
Parliament relatively quickly, considering the entire process lasted only about a year from
proposal to passage. The Japanese Government may have seen the influence REACH was going
to have on trade in the long term and acted quickly to avoid a drop off in trade or a possible trade
deficient in Brussels’ favor. Japan’s adoption of REACH-like policies ensured continued access
to the EU market. However, Japan tailored these new amendments for them to operate more
smoothly in their own work culture.
One of the policies adopted by Japan from REACH was the speeding up of the risk
assessment process from the ‘old’ substances already on the market. Unlike the European
legislation, however, Japan sets up a ‘prioritization’ approach. “Based on such information
provided by industry, the government will make a list of ‘priority chemicals.’…when a substance
falls into the ‘priority chemicals’ category, industry is required to conduct a hazard assessment,
and is subject to further risk assessment by the government.”65 Japan adopted the general
practice of the REACH’s policy to speed up risk assessment, but customized it to fit their own
regulation policies.
Japan copied many of the same ideas of REACH, but it diverged greatly from Europe on
who should bear the responsibility of risk assessment. As discussed earlier, one of the main
policies Japan took from REACH was to regulate old chemicals already on the market and to
speed up the process of assessing them. However, one of the most important differences is who
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oversees the process and who is in charge of conducting risk assessment. Earlier in the thesis, it
was stated that REACH places this responsibility on the industry manufacturers. In Japan,
however, the responsibility of risk assessment is placed on the government not the
manufacturers. Naiki lays out four reasons why Japan uses this approach as opposed to the
European one, but only two are relevant for this thesis. First, Naiki discusses the reason why the
Japanese government retains responsibility over risk assessment. “Why wasn’t the [government]
attracted by industry responsibility? It is difficult to discern a clear reasoning from the
proceedings, but one member in the working group stated that ‘basically, risk assessment done
by the government is more trustworthy (than that one done by industry).’”66 Indeed, the working
group established by the three ministries mentioned above understood the lack of trust citizens
had in private industries, and believed it was best for the government to have the final say in risk
assessment.
Second, Naiki writes: “there was no emerging action on the part of Japanese industry to
support REACH-type reforms. Yet, since Europe is the second largest export destination for
Japan, Japanese industry needs to implement REACH respectively in order to continue trading
with Europe.”67 Manufacturers in Japan were not enthusiastic, or able and willing to adopt
REACH-like reforms if they did not have to. However, it was understood that continued access
to the European market forced them to adopt these policies.
Naiki’s first and second points show that Japanese citizens’ lack of trust in industry
integrity led the government to ensure the oversight of chemical risk assessment. Unlike in the
EU where industry bears all of the responsibility, in Japan the industry contributes some, but the
final risk assessment lays with the government.
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In addition to Naiki’s findings, in The Brussels Effect, Anu Bradford also discusses
Japan’s adoption of REACH-like policies. To a lesser extent than South Korea, Japan amended
Kashinho to mirror some REACH policies, but veered away from duplicating the entire
legislation. “However, Japanese law does not, for instance, extend the need to disclose
information regarding the entire supply chain. Importantly, the government conducts risk
assessment in Japan, whereas under REACH, industries that manufacture or import chemicals in
quantities exceeding ten tons bear that responsibility.”68 Bradford states that Japan does not force
the industry manufacturers to include the entire supply chain from the start of the chemical
production to the finished product. The reason for that is because the government oversees the
risk assessment of the chemicals and the industry does not, contrary to Europe.
Japan’s oversight of the chemical industry rests mainly on the government with only
some input from private manufacturers. As stated above, citizen’s lack of trust in private industry
is one of the main reasons. Private companies understand the fruitful European market and they
need to ensure they abide by their regulations to ensure their continued access. Though Japan did
not copy word for word from REACH, in contrast to South Korea, they instead adopted the
policies that would fit their workplace culture more and still have access to the European market.

China

China’s intense economic growth throughout the 1990s and first two decades of the 21st
century has catapulted it to the top of the list of EU trading partners. As of 2014, China’s
chemical industry was valued to be USD $930.7 billion, way ahead of the United States at only
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USD $517.7 billion. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) projected in 2006 that China’s
chemical industry would grow at a rate of 10.6% per year.69 Indeed, China’s rise to the top has
offset the historical balance between North America and Europe, and now forces these nations to
adapt. In “Controlling Chemical Hazards: Global Governance, National Regulation?” Tomas
Mac Sheoin writes: “Effective law enforcement has been a challenge for the government. Some
of the factors that comprise this include legislative lacunae such as the lack of effective penalty
clauses and implementation procedures.”70 Sheoin’s first point is that the lack of government
oversight leads to local governments being content with not following Beijing’s laws. If the laws
are not to be enforced, then why follow them? Further, Sheoin writes:
Particular problems result from the fact that that 2,500 local Environmental
Protection Bureaus (EPBs), which are responsible for the day-to-day enforcement
of environmental regulations, while ultimately reporting to the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) in Beijing, also report to local governments,
which control their financial and human resources…EPBs often lack proper
technology and a trained cadre to monitor and enforce standards, whereas
discharge fees, despite being prescribed in governmental regulations, ‘are in
reality negotiable with EPBs or local governments.’71
Sheoin writes that the local EPBs do not have the proper resources to follow the protection
legislation imposed by Beijing. For the environmental protection to be successful, the local
governments need these resources, or the entire body of legislation is pointless.
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Why am I writing about Chinese environmental protection legislation in this thesis? For
the Chinese government to adopt REACH policies, the entire line, from chemical producers in
Yichung City to the finished product being shipped off from a dock in Guangzhou, needs to be
airtight. No illegal chemicals, or corruption in local government, can allow this to happen if
China wants to continue shipping their goods to the EU market.
Trade between the Chinese and European markets is enormous. Trade between the two
countries in 2020 amounted to €585 billion. China was the third largest exporter to the EU and
the largest partner for imports.72 The main goods exported to China from the EU are machinery
and equipment, motor vehicles and aircraft, whereas the main goods exported to the EU from
China are consumer goods, footwear and also machinery and equipment.73 The goods traded
between the two markets help drive the economies of both countries. Therefore, China’s need to
adopt REACH-like policies is high.
According to “Regulating Chemicals: Law, Science and the Unbearable Burdens of
Regulation,” China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2010 revised their provisions on
chemical protections. “China released a revised version of the Provisions on Environmental
Administration of New Chemical Substances under which companies are required to submit new
chemical substance notifications to the Chemical Registration Center (CRC) of the MEP for new
chemicals irrespective of annual production tonnage.”74 Following the EU passage of REACH in
2006, China understood that they had to update their chemical regulations and did so four years

72

“China- EU: International Trade in Goods Statistics.” Eurostate, Statistics Explained.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/China-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics
73
“Countries and Regions: China.” European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andregions/countries/china/#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20and%20China,open%20trading%20relations%20
with%20China.
74
“Regulating Chemicals: Law, Science and the Unbearable Burdens of Regulation.” Annual Reviews.
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122654

37

later. This became known as China REACH, albeit some major differences. Unlike South Korea
where much of the European version was adopted into their legislation, China fares more like
Japan, but still with some differences. “China REACH has no requirements for registration (with
data) for the 45,612 chemicals already listed in the Chinese existing chemical inventory.”75
Registration of already listed chemicals are not required to be newly listed, even after the
passage of the new amendments. This is a significant difference from the EU, South Korea and
Japan as they require all substances to be listed. Further, unlike the two markets previously
discussed, “in China REACH, some ecotoxicological tests must be carried out on Chinesespecific creatures in certified Chinese laboratories.”76 As we know, China’s government has a
larger and more influential say in their chemical industry as their government is different from
the two already mentioned. Industry in China is more regulated as well, giving significantly more
power to its government, and allowing them to decide what chemicals can and cannot be present
on the market and which ones can be investigated further for the risks they impose on the health
of its citizens and to the environment.
Additionally, in The Brussels Effect, Anu Bradford writes further about the policies
China’s Ministry of Environment Protection adopted in 2010.
China’s tonnage-based notification system (that is, a system requiring
different disclosures for quantities of 1 ton, 10 tons, etc.) is similar to REACH’s
structure. Thus, both systems apply the principle of ‘higher volume, more data.’
Also, the Chinese reform, like REACH, subjects both producers and importers to
annual reporting and record-keeping requirements.77
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Bradford points out that China was—and still is—impacted by the EU’s health and
environmental legislation, and until China’s government decides to surpass the EU in tightening
regulations, Brussels will be the major force.
Further, Bradford states China has adopted many policies almost immediately after the
EU imposed them. For example, Bradford uses an example of consumer products and children’s
toys. Bradford writes: “a year after the EU restricted the use of phthalate plasticizers in toys,
China similarly updated its own toy safety standard in 2014. The new Chinese safety standard
presented a significant change, and it was made with reference to the prevailing EU standards.”78
China’s quick response to EU restriction shows the importance that the European market is to
them, and the strength and influence that the bloc’s regulations have on foreign markets. As will
be discussed next, China’s regulations are more in line with United States legislation, although
their governments and approach to industry are drastically different.

78

Ibid., 204.

39

Chapter 6: The United States’ Independent Approach to Chemical Regulation

Unlike the previous three countries discussed, the United States takes a unique approach
regarding its regulations. The United States’ main guiding regulatory document is the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), entering into force in 1976. The TSCA was conceived based on
a paper titled Toxic Substances written by the Executive Office of the President’s Council of
Environmental Quality (CEQ) in 1971. The CEQ was concerned about the gap between the
health of individuals and the laws regarding the quality of the air and water. Congress eventually
wrote much of what the paper proposed into law in 1976.79 The passage of the TSCA was a
success at the time for environmentalists and for those who believed the current laws were not
strict enough for regulating the health of individuals. The final text, however, was still a
compromise for those that believed the passage was too much government regulation. Even
worse, adverse judicial interpretation and weak implementation by the federal government and
states rendered the document almost useless, as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
relies on informal voluntary measures to regulate the chemical companies more than they strictly
implement the legislation.80 The United States Congress made little attempt to enforce this
legislation and left much of the work up to the respective states where many also made only
small attempts at enforcement. However, when a single river runs through numerous states, it
will only take one small incident to affect the others downstream.
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The last major response Congress made following an environmental disaster was in 1989
following the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Southern Alaska. Unlike the European
Union who prefers to act before a disaster strikes, the United States favors a “show me the
bodies” approach, where they wait until after a disaster occurs before taking action. The
approach in the US is championed by anti-regulators those who believe in smaller government.
After the above-mentioned oil spill, Congress passed the “Oil Pollution Act of 1990 which
significantly strengthened federal regulation.”81 According to the EPA, the legislation
“streamlined and strengthened the EPA’s ability to prevent and respond to catastrophic oil spills.
A trust fund financed by a tax on oil is available to clean up spills when the responsible party is
incapable or unwilling to do so.”82 Congress used their governing power to ensure another
disaster like the Exxon-Valdez could be cleaned up safely and effectively, albeit what antiregulators wanted. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill of 2011, which was larger and more
disastrous, failed to create any legislation, as anti-regulators proved successful in their quest to
block government oversight. Tomas Mac Sheoin writes: “While legislation was introduced that
would tighten regulatory standards for offshore drilling and put a higher dollar limit on liability
for damages, strong Republican support for offshore oil drilling prevented its enactment.”83
Twenty years after what many thought would be the worst oil disaster in history were proven
wrong. However, Congress united to act in 1989 which they failed to do twenty years later
because of the increased strength of private business interests. This can be seen as a point where
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the European Union increased its power in being the world’s regulator. Unlike in 1989, where
the EU’s predecessor, the European Community consisted of nations west of the Berlin Wall, in
2011, the European Union had expanded eastward, encompassing many former Soviet occupied
states and a significantly expanded into a larger market. At the same time, the US was backing
away from regulating pollutants and toxic waste. This evidence further proves my argument that
the European Union is the world’s largest and most important regulator, overtaking the United
States especially following the 2011 oil spill. The EU’s increased market strength since 1989
assists this claim.
Four large, comprehensive international treaties have come into force in the second half
of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century regarding hazardous
chemicals and toxic waste. The influence of these treaties has proved important for governments
reforming their chemical regulatory laws, but have also revealed differing national views, pitting
countries against each other. It is important to understand the background of each agreement,
why were written initially, and then detail the importance of implementation or nonimplementation of their policies. In addition, I show which agreements the US and EU members
have signed and ratified.
First, the Basel Convention deals with the shipment of toxic waste from industrialized
countries to poorer, mostly African states. The convention went into force in 1989 and was in
response to the massive increase in shipments of toxic waste throughout the 1980s. In the United
States alone, the number of companies looking to export waste reported to the EPA went from
only 12 in 1980 to more than 638 in 1988. The European Union is a party to the convention,
along with all EU member states, whereas the United States signed it, but its Senate has not
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ratified it.84 Toxic waste management affects every country, no matter where the waste ends up.
Shipping the waste to Nigeria can have ill effects as far away as Australia, as a globalized world
will have products shipped from the former to the latter, resulting in harm to the latter.
Second, the Rotterdam Convention was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2004.
The treaty bans 40 chemicals but considering there are over 80,000 chemicals on the market in
the United States alone, this number seems rather small. However, attempting to get all parties to
sign onto the banning of certain chemicals is a monumental task in itself. One of the largest
obstacles was attempting to ban asbestos, which we know as being very toxic and can eventually
lead to cancer. Canada played a large role in defending the product, as it operated one of the
largest mines. Eventually, once that mine closed in 2013, Ottawa surrendered and eventually
supported the effort to ban the toxin.85 As with most treaties and international decisions, the
decision to ban or fight to keep certain chemicals on the market is a political issue. Like the
Basel Convention, the European Union, along with 164 other UN member states and a handful of
observer nations are partied to the Rotterdam Convention, whereas the United States is not.
Third, the Convention on Long Range/Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) was
written during the Cold War and went into effect in 1983. The treaty was a major win for
environmentalists and diplomats especially those interested in the East-West détente. It was one
of the first treaties that brought together Europe’s Eastern and Western Blocs, plus Canada and
the United States. The treaty was successful in decreasing emissions, especially sulfur, but not to
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the extent that the treaty called for.86 The treaty’s importance rests on the fact that emissions do
not just harm the health of citizens and the environment in one country, they affect neighboring
countries as well. Reducing one’s emissions helps everyone at large.
Fourth, the Stockholm Convention was written in 2001 and covers pesticides and
safeguarding the health of citizens and the environment. Unlike the previous three conventions
discussed, the Stockholm Convention does not have one standard set of rules that all countries
need to abide by. Instead, developing countries are exempt from certain parts of the treaty that
industrialized countries must follow.87 The convention takes into consideration countries of the
global south, many of whom cannot afford to obey the strict policies imposed on the advanced
OECD countries.
These four conventions eventually establish two sides of the debate on regulating toxins
in the international community, as argued by Tomas Mac Sheoin. “Two main positions have
been identified in these negotiations: on one side are the United States and the chemical industry;
on the other, the European Union and various other national governments, as well as
international and non-governmental organizations (INGOs).”88 Following a lack of reform in its
own chemical regulation policies, and the rise of the EU’s influence, the United States ceased to
be the world’s regulator, and blindly passed that torch to the EU. As will be discussed further in
this chapter, the US’s TSCA policies have been largely ignored and have since become outdated.
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John S. Applegate continues by discussing the EU’s adoption of the precautionary
principle. The precautionary principle was first introduced in 1972 following the Stockholm
conference on the environment and was developed further in 1985 at a Vienna Conference
discussing the depletion of the ozone layer and can be defined as moving legislation forward
albeit scientific uncertainty of a specific causal outcome. In the context of REACH, there may be
uncertainty regarding the environmental or health risks, however, limits should be placed to
ensure a toxic incedent does not commit major damage. The text states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.89
The European Union wants to ensure that an environmental disaster, regardless of size, does not
occur, and therefore puts laws into place before one can. Uncertainty regarding a hazard can be
quite large, but governmental institutions step in to ensure they have some control over the
situation. The United States’ TSCA was never amended to encompass the precautionary
principle, and therefore, it is left up to private companies and state and local governments to
ensure a disaster is met with a proper response. As discussed earlier, a disaster that occurs
upriver will affect everyone living downstream, regardless of municipal boundaries.
John S. Applegate further discusses three points that demonstrate the differences between
REACH and TSCA. First REACH’s approach is to find safer alternatives to industrial chemicals.
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It has been noted that it would be improbable to attempt to have a chemical-free future. Instead,
REACH provides incentives for chemical manufacturers to develop less hazardous and more
environmentally friendly products. Additionally, it is the chemical companies who are held
responsible for the safety of their chemicals. Since they are legally required to provide this
information to consumers, it would cause a public relations nightmare for the company if
consumers discovered the company was selling highly toxic products. “The authorization
procedure that is required for the most dangerous chemicals creates an even more intense
regulatory incentive to find safer substitutes…Authorization is public and expensive…and public
analysis is likely to be highly critical of the manufacturers.”90 Applegate states that REACH
policies give large incentives to chemical companies to reduce the toxicity levels in their
products. The combination of the law and the possibility of outrage from the public will lead to
(if it hasn’t already) chemical manufacturers to finding safer alternatives than what they are
using already.
Second, REACH relies on the principle of “right-to-know,” which TSCA does not yet
require. Right-to-know laws have two purposes, both of which are important. “The normative
purpose gives the legislation its name: citizens are entitled to know the chemicals to which they
are exposed and the chemicals’ effects. The instrumental purpose of right-to-know laws is to
embarrass the users or emitters of chemicals, which has been shown…to act as a strong incentive
to reduce or replace the chemicals.”91 What seems like a small clause in REACH, ensuring
consumers have open access to what is in their products, has a big impact. Companies do not
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want to face backlash from their buyers, and to avoid this, they will develop new, safer
chemicals. It is a short, one-line sentence in the legislation, but it has large influence.
Third, REACH severely limits the use of chemical testing on animals. The American
people are significantly less concerned than populations in other Western countries. However,
Applegate writes that the reduction in animal testing presents a problem
The reduction in animal testing runs directly counter to the commitment to
generate more test data…In debates over REACH, industry and animal rights
groups both emphasized the uncertainties of animal tests as a surrogate for testing
on humans, and they agreed on the desirability of finding alternatives.92
This conflict between testing and not testing on animals also presents a question to the populace
at large: should I risk using these products on myself when they have not been tested on other
living things? To answer that question, the deal struck between the animal rights groups and the
chemical industry is to use quantitative chemical structure-activity (QSAR). “QSAR analysis and
in-vitro testing [can be used] as a substitute for traditional animal testing. By translating the
results of non-animal testing to mammalian effects, QSARs aspire to be the cheap, ‘fast track
option to deal with data gaps on chemicals.’”93 What usually seems, from an American point of
view anyway, as an almost impossible compromise between large corporations and animal rights
groups, was actually achieved. Testing on animals was decided to be a last resort option by both
parties. Those against further government regulation in the United States have been very
successful in recent years at ensuring Washington does not go too far. However, eventually the
time will come that the government will need to ensure that private businesses upgrade their
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chemical safety regulations for the health of people and the environment, and, most importantly
to many, to ensure that access to the European Union remains open.
One major difference between governmental regulations in the United States and other
countries is the powers the American constitution delegates to the states. As this thesis discussed
in an earlier chapter, the governments of South Korea, Japan and China were more easily able to
impose regulation on chemical manufacturers for numerous reasons, but one that was not
discussed is their greater authority over more local, provincial governments. States rights are
deeply rooted in the history of the United States, going back to the founding of the nation. As we
still see today, states justice departments can sue the federal government if it imposes a policy it
does not agree with, or the state believes is unfair, unjust or contrary to its position. The
combination of states rights and anti-regulation hawks make it incredibly difficult for members
of Congress to pass any form of legislation, much less sweeping, impactful laws.
Chris Hastings, in “TSCA Reforms and the Need to Preserve State Chemical Safety
Laws” elaborates further on this point. Hastings begins by using an early court case regarding
nuclear safety. The court ruled that the federal government held sole authority over the
regulation of nuclear power.
In English v. General Electric Co, [1990] the court determined that the federal
government exclusively occupied the field of nuclear safety…because the federal
government began regulating in 1954 with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act,
continued regulating with the Energy Reorganization Act in 1974, and had
routinely amended both statues.94
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In this example, the court ruled that the federal government had exclusive control over nuclear
energy, and that the states only had limited powers, given to them by federal authorities. Further,
the federal government continued to amend and reform the original law, most notably in 1974,
giving further credibility to Washington’s power. The federal government’s actions regarding
nuclear safety, stands in direct contrast to their lack of actions when it comes to regulating
toxins. Unlike nuclear safety, the federal government has not amended the TSCA at all since its
inception in 1976. Hastings notes that it has been individual states in the past two decades that
have taken it upon themselves to impose regulations. “TSCA expressly permits states to ban a
chemical even if the EPA has issued a requirement on the chemical. Therefore—because of the
absence of federal toxics regulations, and because of the many laws passed by states in recent
years—states have traditionally regulated the field of chemical safety.”95 TSCA allows states to
create legislation regarding their chemical industries, but each state will have its own code of
laws, differing from state to state. The TSCA essentially serves as the lowest bar which states
must comply with. However, other nations have upgraded their laws to be more in line with the
European Union, the federal government of the United States should do the same but the
backlash by business interests continue to be a challenge.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

This thesis discussed the influence the European Union’s REACH program had on
nations’ chemical regulation policies around the world. Three of the EU’s largest trading
partners, South Korea, Japan and China all updated their chemical regulation policies to comply
with the bloc. The tumultuous history of Europe over the past five centuries forced its member
states to cooperate in a new way and ensure peace could be sustained. European integration after
World War II brought the two main belligerents of the second millennium, France and Germany,
together ensuring war was an act of the past. The regulatory authority of the EU is overseen by
the three main bodies of the organization: The Council of the European Union, the European
Parliament and the European Commission. These bodies must ensure that the regulations
imposed by the Union are implemented throughout the bloc’s 27 member states. The REACH
legislation enacted in 2007 is the world’s most innovative, putting the health and safety of its
citizens and environment before that of large corporations and interests of the few. Many of the
REACH policies evolved out of single member states like Sweden and Austria and eventually
adopted by the Union at large. Reforming the bloc’s chemical industry was not a simple task, as
Brussels faced backlash from European member states and large industry, along with that from
non-EU countries like the United States and its chemical industry. However, the EU’s adoption
of REACH forced other nations to draft their own REACH-like legislation, including South
Korea, Japan and China, all with their own adjustments. These three countries are some of the
EU’s largest trading partners, and to ensure continued access to its market, respective companies
needed to be in compliance with their regulations. However, another large trading partner, the
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United States, did not reform to the extent that the Asian countries did. Anti-regulators and
proponents of small government oversight helped block any sweeping legislation Congress
attempted to pass. The country’s guiding document, the TSCA, is outdated and has not been
properly updated since its inception in 1976.
The research demonstrated the importance that REACH had on other major economies
around the world. Brussels succeeded in become the “world’s regulator,” proving that the EU’s
market is an important destination for goods from around the world. Countries were forced to
comply with the European Union’s new chemical regulations, whether they wanted to or not.
The difference between the four countries discussed is the extent each government took to ensure
their respective companies’ compliance. South Korea and the United States are on opposite ends,
the former adopting many of REACH’s policies, mirroring much of the EU’s legislation,
whereas the United States left it up to its individual companies, forced to do so by private
businesses’ objections to government oversight. Japan and China were more moderate, adopting
some REACH-like policies but modified them to their liking. This research answered the first
question presented in this thesis: how far will the European Union’s policies go to influencing
other countries to adopt some of their policies?
The second question: Will another country eventually hold the torch of the “world’s
regulator?” proves more difficult to answer than the first. Based on the completed research, it is
unlikely that another country will take over the lead as the “world’s regulator” in the foreseeable
future. Japan and South Korea are major exporters to the European Union, and have large
economies respectively, but not large enough for other nations to accept full compliance with
any new regulations implemented. The evidence provided in this thesis proves that antiregulators and promoters of small government in the United States possess too much control over

51

legislators for them to pass any expansive chemical regulations that could rival that of the EU,
and force other large economies to change their regulations. China is the only nation left that
remains capable of holding the torch. However, this possibility remains highly unlikely. As
based on the research, we learned that environmental protection in China can be corrupt and
unless Beijing reforms the chain of command, corruption will continue to thrive. Additionally,
China only ensured compliance with the EU because of the importance of its market, valued at
half a trillion Euros. If the bloc’s market were smaller and less important to its trade China, most
likely, would not comply and possibly just lose the market entirely. Further, the reason this thesis
discussed these four nations in particular is because they are large trading partners of the EU and
they are developed economies. There are developing nations, such as India and Brazil, that might
one day be in a position to further regulate their chemical industries, but I believe it is safe to say
that this will not occur for at least another half century. Therefore, I believe it is accurate to state
that the European Union will continue to be the “world’s regulator” for decades to come.

Recommendations

Based on the research presented throughout this thesis, for the health and safety of the
entire human population the developed and soon to graduate developing world needs to have one
set of chemical regulations. The differing laws throughout the world regarding chemical
regulations not only hurts those living in that respective country, but in every country in the
world. For example, chemical waste that is dumped in the Western Atlantic Ocean, off the coast
of the United States, will affect all nations. The United States has relatively relaxed chemical
regulations compared to its northern neighbor and the most regulated bloc in the world, the EU,
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which is across the ocean. The ocean’s currents will eventually take that waste to both
destinations harming the environment and the health of its citizens. It does not matter how strict
the regulations are in one country of the world, because similar to this example, chemical waste
will affect all, regardless of region.
However, it is understood that every nation cannot abide by strict standards that Brussels
imposes. It would be almost impossible for developing countries like India and Brazil to fully
comply with these laws. The developed world should have their own set of rules which includes
the United States. But, as discussed in the previous paragraph, waste affects everyone, and the
environment does not recognize geopolitical boundaries. Therefore, international regulations
should be implemented, to help graduate developing countries with chemical industries to
eventually be among the developed nations. It is understood that further regulation will lead to
higher prices and a switch to less expensive chemicals which would probably be manufactured in
less developed countries. However, this can be offset by developed countries ensuring
compliance to their own regulations, which would force chemical companies in developing
nations to comply.
This recommendation is crucial to ensure the health and safety of human beings and the
environment they live in. It is understood and almost guaranteed that the price of chemicals will
increase due to these new regulations and the compliance by chemical companies. Additionally,
there will be hesitancy and pushback from chemical manufacturers as seen when the EU was
discussing REACH. However, this also might be a blessing in disguise. Chemical companies will
be forced to develop new products to ensure they are in compliance with these new regulations.
These new chemicals will be safer and ensure the consumer and the environment will not be
poisoned by the product. Eventually, the product produced in these countries will trickle down to
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developing ones that do not have their own chemical industries or manufacturing capability, and
their citizens and environment will also benefit from the regulations. Regulations from
developed nations have far reaching effects to countries around the world, regardless of their
geopolitical status. Reforming the chemical industry will benefit everyone and ensure a safer, a
more environmentally friendly, and a more prosperous future.
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